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Who has seized power in Crimea?
By Ellie Knott
According to recent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister,
Sergei Lavrov,Russia has claimed to be acting to protect the rights not just of citizens and military personnel, but
also compatriots and Russian speakers in Crimea. But how far do Crimeans feel discriminated? Ellie Knott, a PhD
student at the London School of Economics, draws on her research to answer this question.
In a previous article for Vostok Cable, I argued that there needed to be a more nuanced understanding of Russian
identity in Crimea. Hence I differentiated between ethnic Russians who accept or enjoy living in a Ukrainian state,
and Discriminated Russians, who identify not just as ethnically Russian but also as the victims of Ukrainisation.
It is the latter who have been heavily involved with pro-Russia movements,
such as Russkaia Obschina Kryma(Russian Community of Crimea), and the
pro-Russia minority party, Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity). There has been
a long-standing cynical attitude to these organisation in Crimea: that they
are professional Russians. As one respondent described these individuals
want “to get money from this” by using their Russian identification as an
occupation to profit from the funding for these organisations which comes
from Russia.
It is these same Russian cultural and political organisations who have led the
renewed separatist movement in Crimea. As soon as Sergei Aksenov, the
leader of Russkoe Edinstvo, seized power, he claimed to be representing the
interests of all Crimeans. However Russkoe Edinstvo were elected by just
4% of the electorate in the 2010 Crimean parliamentary elections.
*
Aksenov was able to seize power as the Prime Minister of Crimea after a
forced vote in the Crimean parliament. The identity and origin of the armed
group who stormed the Crimean parliament on 27 February, forcing the voter
later in the day, remain unknown. However the links between Russkoe
Edinstvo and the Russian administration run deep, both at the local level with personal links to the Russian
consulate in the peninsula, through the organizational structure of the Compatriot policy, and several individuals
from these groups have been awarded cultural and social medals by the Russian Federation for their work.
In the election materials of Russkoe Edinstvo, the idea of discrimination against Russians in Crimea is a major
motivation. Hence their electoral platform in 2010 focused primarily on protecting the “humanitarian rights of
Russians and Russian-cultural Crimeans”. In the leaflets of Molodie, the youth wing of Russkoe Edinstvo, they
claimed also that they needed to defend themselves against “enemies of the Russian world” who were trying to
“oppress and kill Russian language and culture”. This discourse of discrimination, and its link to the minority
Russian separatists, existed in Crimea well before the world’s attention shifted there. The difference now is that
the pro-Russian authorities, with the help of the Russian government, and likely the military, have made this
discourse go viral, with Russia mirroring the mantra of Russkoe Edinstvo by claiming that it is legitimate to act to
protect the “humanitarian rights” of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea.
Perceptions of discrimination were common among just a minority of ethnic Russians that I interviewed in Crimea
in 2012-2013. They were angered by what they saw as Ukraine’s “forced” Ukrainisation policies which had
infringed on the “rights of Russians” because “priority” was now given to Ukrainian language in society and
Soldiers wearing no identifying insignia have rapidly seized
control of Crimea’s military facilities after Yanukovic was
overthrown in Kiev.
education. They were angered because of the decline of Russian language in schools. But also because even in
Russian language schools, they were required to teach what they perceived to be a “totally Ukrainian” version of
history which required them to teach the “history of collaborators” in the second world war, such as Stepan
Bandera and Roman Shukhevych.
While Stepan Bandera is lauded as a Ukrainian national hero in western Ukraine, in the east and south, and in
Crimea, he is depicted as a fascist collaborator, working against the Soviet Union. This idea of Ukrainian
nationalism and nationalisation of the state is depicted as analogous to fascism, by this very small pro-Russian
group who in the first few days of protests in Crimea mobilised under the slogan of “down with fascism”. In recent
days, posters have also appeared in Sevastopol indicating that the referendum is a choice between Russia and
fascism.
It is easy to dismiss claims of discrimination as ridiculous given the advantages currently enjoyed by those with a
pro-Russian stance, but it is interesting also to reflect on how far feelings of discrimination resonate more broadly
in Crimean society. Few I interviewed, outside of those who were pro-Russia, described feeling discriminated in
terms of Russian language and culture in peninsula. In large part because they felt Russian was majority culture
and language in the peninsula and protected by the local government. Russian culture and language were not
perceived as under threat because the Russian “question” was rarely seen as an “acute issue”.
The only example that was often cited by respondents was their dissatisfaction with an all-Ukrainian law that
required foreign films in cinemas to be dubbed in Ukrainian, rather than Russian. But as one respondent
described it, this was not a “strangulation of Russian culture” but “just a bad law”. In all other aspects of life,
respondents felt comfortable in the ability to perform their daily functions in Russian language.
*
The pro-Russia organisations involved in the seizure of
power in Crimea are acting again as “professional Russians”.
Discrimination was a convenient rhetoric for these
professionals because these feelings already resonated with
a minority of the population, embedded by economic
peripheralisation in post-Soviet Crimea. This discrimination
discourse was convenient to legitimise their newly seized
authority and disguise the other motivations behind the power
grab, such as protecting Russia’s military assets in the
peninsula.
It is unclear what Professional Russians would gain from
being part of the Russian Federation or a frozen conflict
between Russia and Ukraine. But at least in the short term
they are able to service their own economic and political
interests, while indicating that troops, who remain unmarked but are likely Russian, were needed for
the referendum to act as a “stabilising” influence to ensure “public order”. Reprisals against those investigating
and questioning the newly empowered pro-Russian separatists are already on the rise, suggesting that Crimea’s
future is not only uncertain but daunting, having empowered militarised elements, such as Cossack groups, to act
violently without repercussions towards dissenters, and in particular towards Crimean Tatars and journalists.
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